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Sealing of Juvenile Court Records
I. INTRODUCTION
Rehabilitation of lawbreakers has traditionally been among
the goals sought to be attained by the judicial process, but no-
where has greater fealty been paid to this elusive lord than in
the philosophy of the juvenile court.' The rehabilitative ideal 2
runs deep, both theoretically and traditionally, in juvenile court
philosophy. The court as parens patriae encounters the youth-
ful offender as a wayward child in need of the fatherly advice
of a benevolent judge.3 Such was the view of its founders4 and,
despite recent decisions that have challenged the court's pro-
cedure,5 the juvenile court today continues to be, at least in
theory, an instrument of rehabilitation.
Rehabilitation of juvenile offenders is a broad field with
uncertain boundaries. The juvenile court in its disposition order
takes the first and perhaps most important step by consigning
the youth to one of a variety of forms of treatment, from
counseling to incarceration." This done, the authority of the
court yields to other agencies or departments of the state.7 Thus,
the bulk of the rehabilitative process lies beyond the control of
the court itself. In regard to the records of the juvenile court
cause, however, the court retains a degree of control over the
rehabilitative process. Article 11 of the Minnesota Juvenile Court
Rules provides that when the child reaches age 21, or perhaps
earlier, his record of delinquency will be sealed absolutely, never
1. See Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 554 (1966); PR smENT's
COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND AD. OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT,
JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND YOUTH CRIME 7 (1967) [hereinafter cited as
TAsK FORCE]; Paulsen, The Juvenile Court and the Whole of the Law,
11 WAYNE L. REV. 597 (1965).
2. Allen, Criminal Justice, Legal Values and the Rehabilitative
Ideal, 50 J. Cnm . L.C. & P.S. 226 (1959), cited in M. PAULSEN & S.
KADISH, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES 89 n.m (1962).
3. See Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L. REV. 104 (1909).
4. TASK FORCE, supra note 1, at 2-3. Contemporary commentators
were also fond of drawing analogies to the field of medicine, seeing thejudge as a doctor treating the pathology of delinquency. See Paulsen,
supra note 1, at 597.
5. E.g., In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
6. See MINN. STAT. § 260.185 (1967). A juvenile court cannot
directly incarcerate a delinquent child, but must first transfer custody
to the Youth Conservation Commission. See MINN. STAT. § 260.185
(1) (d) (1967). See note 92 infra.
7. Since probation officers are officers of the court, juveniles
placed on probation remain subject to the court to a certain extent.
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to be revealed to any person, including courts, police or cor-
rectional authorities. This Note will first examine the possible
effects such a procedure may have on rehabilitation. Certain
problems, such as the availability of police records and the use of
juvenile court records in subsequent judicial proceedings, will
be discussed and the likely success of the Rules in solving these
problems will be evaluated.
II. THE REHABILITATIVE IDEAL
Rehabilitation is intended to serve both the child and so-
ciety by enabling the child to lead a lawful and fruitful life, to
realize his own abilities and to become a useful member of so-
ciety." The first step in this process is likely to be society's
willingness to accept the ex-offender as a person, despite his
past antisocial conduct.9 While the adjudication of delinquency
is itself a form of rejection by society, 0 a much more deleterious
effect arises from the continuing stigma of the child's record.'
Part of this stigma is caused by the child's knowledge that
a public record of his past unlawful conduct exists. This alone
can be a significant factor in reinforcing his self-image of
worthlessness, thus stimulating continued delinquent be-
havior.'2  But in addition to this, the fact that others know, or
may know, of his past offense can defeat the social integration
which is the goal of juvenile rehabilitation.3 For example, as a
8. See Lipsitt, Due Process as a Gateway to Rehabilitation in the
Juvenile Justice System, 49 Bos. U.L. Ri. 62, 63 (1969).
9. See Grygier, The Concept of the "State of Delinquency" and
Its Consequences for Treatment of Young Offenders, 11 WAYNE L. REV.
627, 645-48 (1965).
10. Grygier, The Concept of "The State of Delinquency"--An Obit-
uary, 18 J. LEGAL ED. 131, 137 (1965).
11. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 23-24 (1967); Winburn v. State, 32 Wis.
2d 152, 162, 145 N.W.2d 178, 183 (1966); Zn re Contreras, 109 Cal. App. 2d
787, 789-90, 241 P.2d 631, 633 (1952); Jones v. Commonwealth, 185 Va.
335, 341-42, 38 S.E.2d 444, 447 (1946). See also Gough, The Expunge-
ment of Adjudication Records of Juvenile and Adult Offenders: A
Problem of Status, 1966 WASH. U.L.Q. 147, 170-71 (1966); Lipsitt, supra
note 8, at 69; TASK FORCE, supra note 1, at 16; Lemert, The Juvenile
Court-Quest and Realities, in TASK FORCE, supra note 1, at 91, 92-93.
12. Lemert, supra note 11, at 93; Wheeler, Cottrell & Romasco,
Juvenile Delinquency-Its Prevention and Control, in TASK FORCE,
supra note 1, at 409, 417; Lipsitt, supra note 8, at 68-69; Rappeport, Some
Legal Aspects of Juvenile Court Proceedings, 46 VA. L. REV. 908, 909
(1960).
13. TAsK FORCE, supra note 1, at 39; Gough, supra note 11, at
147-48; Rappeport, supra note 12, at 909-10; Wheeler, Cottrell & Romasco,
supra note 12, at 424.
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result of disclosure of his juvenile record, the youth is often
barred from employment, or is limited to menial jobs lacking in
responsibility and fulfillment.' 4 While other consequences, such
as ineligibility for certain Armed Forces opportunities may
arise,u discrimination in employment opportunities is by far the
most significant, due to the central importance of a job in deter-
mining economic advancement and self-respect.' 6 Employment
discrimination also reinforces the juvenile's feelings of worth-
lessness and inability and consequently it contributes to delin-
quency 17 not only in precluding ex-offenders from employment,
but in weakening whatever desire they may have to adhere to a
lawful life.
To protect the child against the adverse effects of stigma-
tization, juvenile court laws have from their inception' s pro-
vided that juvenile proceedings shall be civil rather than
criminal, 19 and that the records of the proceedings shall be
confidential,20 that is, the records shall not be disclosed to out-
siders without a prior court order. The first has proved to be a
change in word only, with no easing of the stigma of conviction.
21
The second has presented no real barrier to the employer who
14. See note 11 supra. See also Burns & Stern, The Prevention of
Juvenile Delinquency, in TASK FORCE, supra note 1, at 353, 385.
15. See Lemert, supra note 11, at 92.
16. See, e.g., TASK FORCE, supra note 1, at 16.
17. Rappeport, supra note 12, at 910.
18. See TASK FORCE, supra note 1, at 3; Paulsen, The Changing
World of Juvenile Law-New Horizons for Juvenile Court Legislation,
40 PA. B. Ass'x Q. 26, 27 (1968); Note, Juvenile Delinquents: The
Police, State Courts, and Individualized Justice, 79 HARv. L. REV. 775,
784 (1966).
19. See, e.g., Mmzw. STAT. § 260.211 (1) (1967).
To get away from the notion that the child is to be dealt with
as a criminal; to save it [sic] from the brand of criminality, the
brand that sticks to it for life; to take it in hand and instead of
first stigmatizing and then reforming it, to protect it from the
stigma, this is the work which is now being accomplished ....
Mack, supra note 3, at 109.
20. See, e.g., MNn. STAT. § 260.161(2) (1967): "[N]one of the rec-
ords of the juvenile court, including legal records, shall be open to
public inspection or their contents disclosed except by order of the
court." Compare MINN. STAT. § 260.211(2) (1967).
21. One commentator has called the distinction not only ineffec-
tual, but "highly misleading sophistry," confusing what juvenile courts
are with what they should be. Tappan, Unofficial Delinquency, 29
NEB. L. REv. 547, 548-49 (1950). See also In re Contreras, 109 Cal. App.
2d 787, 241 P.2d 631 (1952), in which the court said that a statute pro-
viding that a finding of delinquency is not deemed a conviction of crime
is "a legal fiction, presenting a challenge to credulity and doing vio-
lence to reason." Id. at 789, 241 P.2d at 633. Accord, Jones v. Com-
monwealth, 185 Va. 335, 38 S.E.2d 444 (1946).
1969]
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seriously desires information about an employee or even an appli-
cant.2 2 The breakdown of confidentiality is not solely the fault
of the juvenile court. It is also attributable to the fact that
even a minimal standard of confidentiality does not apply to
police records.23 In addition, police records frequently do not
reflect the subsequent disposition of the child.24 Hence, even
children who are not referred to juvenile court by the police, or
whose causes are dismissed by the court, or who are not adjudi-
cated delinquent, retain a police record in most instances.25 The
police record, rather than the court record, is the one most
likely to be perennially troublesome to the juvenile. 26
The harm inherent in the availability even of court records
is compounded by the fact that the records are not always accu-
rate, perhaps due to what one commentator has called the
"cumbersome and archaic" procedures used in compiling and
storing information.27  Moreover, released information consist-
ing merely of the statutory definition of the offense can be mis-
leading. For example, "theft" could include the shoplifting of a
trivial item. Even the definitions of delinquency are so amor-
phous that in many cases the delinquent nature of a child's
acts may depend as much on the attitude of the police or the
parents as on the acts themselves. 28
22. TAsK FORCE, supra note 1, at 54; Lemert, supra note 11, at 93;
Burns & Stern, supra note 14, at 385; Note, supra note 18, at 784-85;
G. O'CONNOR & N. WATSON, JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND YOUTH CRIAIn:
THE POLICE ROLE 60 (1965). The medical community is equally vul-
nerable to charges of laxity in observing confidentiality. See, e.g.,
Malmquist, Problems of Confidentiality in Child Psychiatry, 35 Am. J.
ORTHoPsYcHIATRY 787, 788 (1965).
23. Cf. Note, supra note 18, at 78.4-85. This is not to imply that
court records are in fact always confidential. See id. at 800. The
Wisconsin Supreme Court recently observed that the failure of con-
fidentiality is "common knowledge." Winburn v. State, 32 Wis. 2d 152,
162, 145 N.W.2d 178, 183 (1966).
24. 2 CALIFORNI GOVERNOR'S SPECIAL STUDY Co1\nv'N ON JUVE-
NILE JUSTICE, A STUDY OF TimE AD. OF JUVENILE JUSTICE IN CALIFORNIA
110 (1960) [hereinafter cited as 2 CimiFoRNIA GovERNoR'S COMM'N];
G. O'CoNNoR & N. WATSON, supra note 22, at 60.
25. 2 CALIFORNIA GOvERNOR'S COm x'N, supra note 24, at 110; G.
O'CONNOR & N. WATSON, supra note 22, at 60.
26. 2 CALIFORNIA GovERNoR's COMYnW'N, supra note 24, at 110.
27. Vinter, The Juvenile Court as an Institution, in TASK FORCE,
supra note 1, at 84, 88. See note 112 infra.
28. Lemert, supra note 11, at 93. In Minnesota, a delinquent child
is one who has violated any law or ordinance (except traffic), or who
is "habitually truant" from school, or who is "uncontrolled" by his
parents because he is "wayward or habitually disobedient," or who
"habitually deports himself in a manner that is injurious or dangerous
[Vol. 54:433
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Data is not presently available to test the validity of the
hypothesis underlying the nondisclosure of juvenile records,
namely, that nondisclosure will facilitate rehabilitation through
the avoidance of stigma.29 However, there is data from which the
benefit of nondisclosure may be inferred. The extensive longi-
tudinal research into the adult lives of former delinquents by
the Gluecks30 indicates that many ex-offenders "turn the cor-
ner" from antisocial conduct in their twenties. Specifically, it
was found that 22.6 percent who had offended prior to age 17 did
not reoffend before age 25, and 48.2 percent committed no crime
between the ages of 25 and 31.31 These figures confirm the
belief in the importance of "delayed maturation" in rehabilita-
tion.32  The significance of these conclusions for purposes of
record sealing is that they tend to show that the prospects for
rehabilitation are most promising when former delinquents are
in their twenties, a period when a person is young enough so
that his attractiveness to a prospective employer, in terms of
physical ability, training capability and longevity, is greatest. It
is at this point that the availability of a previous record could
thwart the ex-offender's chances for employment and thus hinder
the emerging maturation process. However, if the previous
record is not available, the chances of employment are increased,
the maturation process is reinforced and the chances of future
to himself or others." ~ivN. STAT. § 260.015 (5) (1967). This definition
is difficult to distinguish from that of the neglected child. See note
36 infra.
29. This premise has apparently not even been seriously ques-
tioned. Arguments against confidentiality or sealing focus on the bal-
ancing of interests between disclosure and nondisclosure and conclude
that whatever benefits nondisclosure may confer are outweighed by
society's "right to know." See, e.g., 2 CALFORN :A GOVERNOR'S CO M 'N,
supra note 24, at 109-10; Brucker, The Right to Know About Juvenile
Delinquents, 15 Juv. CT. JUDGEs J. 16 (Summer, 1964).
30. S. GLuEcK & E. GLUECK, DELINQUENTS AND NONDELINQUENTS
IN PERSPEcTIVE (1968).
31. Id. at 147-52. The reduction was more marked in serious of-
fenses. If the quoted figures are included with those who were occa-
sionally convicted of minor offenses, offenses against the public order,
violation of conditions of probation or parole and simple assault, the
figures are 37.9 percent in the 17-25 age bracket, and 67.4 percent in
the 25-31 age bracket. Id. at 151.
32. Id. In an earlier work, the Gluecks concluded that the decrease
in unlawful activity occurs not at a chronological age, but at the con-
clusion of a certain length of time following the onset of delinquent
behavior. S. GLUECK & E. GLUECK, JUVENILE DELINQUENTS GROWN
Up 105 (1940). This decrease was attributed to a delayed maturation
process. Id.
19691
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offense are minimized. Rehabilitation, in other words, has ef-
fectively begun.
Though the positive effect of employment on rehabilitation
is widely noted,83 the Gluecks' research indicates a susceptibil-
ity to rehabilitation during the early adult years, which can be
exploited by employment. Insofar as nondisclosure of a youth's
record encourages his employment, the rehabilitative protential
of nondisclosure seems significant. While nondisclosure has his-
torically been an integral part of the juvenile court philosophy,
the juvenile has been betrayed by the false protection of con-
fidentiality in practice. The Minnesota Juvenile Court Rules,
while adhering to the principle of confidentiality, provide for its
administration with considerably more vigor than has heretofore
been known in Minnesota or in most other states.3 4
III. ANALYSIS OF ARTICLE 11
A. NEGLECT AND DEPENDENCY CAusEs NOT INCLUDED
At the outset, it must be noted that the sealing provisions
of Article 11 apply only to the records pertaining to a delin-
quency cause.35 Records pertaining 1to neglect 36 or dependency 3 7
33. See, e.g., Freedman & Cohen, Delinquency, Employment and
Youth Development, in READINGS IN DELINQUENCY AND TREATMENT 17
(R. Schasre & J. Wallach eds. 1965); TAsK FORCE, supra note 1, at 54-56;
Burns & Stern, supra note 14, at 378; Wheeler, Cottrell & Romasco,
supra note 12, at 416-17.
34. Despite increased concern in recent years with the problem
of the juvenile offender, sealing statutes are still the exception. Only
nine states now have statutes which purport to seal records. ALASKA
STAT. § 47.10.060(e) (1962); AiZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-238 (1956); CAL.
WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 781 (West Supip. 1966); IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-
3215a (Burns Supp. 1969); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-815(h) (1964); N.J.
REV. STAT. § 2A:4-39.1 (Supp. 1968); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 55-10-117,
55-10-118 (Supp. 1969); VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-193 (1960); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 33, § 665 (Supp. 1969). The statutes in two of these states,
however, are so seriously qualified as to cast considerable doubt on
their value in juvenile rehabilitation. ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.060(e)
(1962) applies only if the juvenile is tried as an adult, while N.J. REv.
STAT. § 2A: 4-39.1 (Supp. 1968) emasculates the protection by excepting
from sealing many offenses likely to be committed by juveniles, in-
cluding robbery, burglary, carrying concealed weapons and rape.
Two more states have statutes providing for the destruction of so-
cial reports, but leave the question of the record itself unanswered and
presumably no sealing is allowed. Mo. REV. STAT. § 211.321 (1962);
WASH. REV. CODE §§ 13.04.230, 13.04.250 (Supp. 1967).
35. The juvenile court has "original and exclusive" jurisdiction
in any cause where the child is alleged to be delinquent, neglected, de-
pendent or a traffic offender. MINN. STAT. § 260.111(1) (1967). While
traffic offender causes, like neglect and dependency causes, are not in-
[Vol. 54:433
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causes are not subject to sealing, and therein lies the gravest
shortcoming of Article 11. One may argue, of course, that
sealing is essentially a means of rehabilitation and a neglected
or dependent child needs no rehabilitation, for he has not of-
fended. While technically correct, such a viewpoint overlooks
the realities of public reaction to children who have been the
subject of juvenile court causes for whatever reason. The public
often fails to appreciate the distinction between delinquent chil-
dren and neglected or dependent children, and assumes that
any child who comes in contact with the juvenile court is a
cluded in Article 11, the stigma arising from traffic violations is
probably nugatory.
36. "Neglected child" means a child:
(a) Who is abandoned by his parent, guardian, or other cus-
todian; or
(b) Who is without proper parental care because of the faults
or habits of his parent, guardian, or other custodian; or
(c) Who is without necessary subsistence, education or other
care necessary for his physical or mental health or morals
because his parent, guardian or other custodian neglects or
refuses to provide it; or
(d) Who is without the special care made necessary by his
physical or mental condition because of [sic] his parent,
guardian, or other custodian neglects or refuses to provide
it; or
(e) Whose occupation, behavior, condition, environment or
associations are such as to be injurious or dangerous to
himself or others; or
(f) Who is living in a facility for foster care which is not
licensed as required by law, unless the child is living in
the facility under court order; or
(g) Whose parent, guardian, or custodian has made arrange-
ments for his placement in a manner detrimental to the
welfare of the child or in violation of law; or
(h) Who comes within [the provisions defining delinquency],
but whose conduct results in whole or in part from par-
ental neglect.
MINN. STAT. § 260.015(10) (1967), as amended, (Mm. SEss. L. SEav.
ch. 503, § 2 (1969) ).
37. "Dependent child" means a child:
(a) Who is without a parent, guardian, or other custodian; or
(b) Who is in need of special care and treatment required by
his physical or mental condition and whose parent, guard-
ian, or other custodian is unable to provide it; or
(c) Whose parent, guardian, or other custodian for good cause
desires to be relieved of his care and custody; or
(d) Who is without proper parental care because of the emo-
tional, mental, or physical disability, or state of immatur-
ity of his parent, guardian, or other custodian.
MImN. STAT. § 260.015(6) (1967), as amended, (MqNu. SEss. L. SEav.
ch. 503, § 1 (1969)). The 1969 amendments reclassified a child "[w]ho
is without proper parental care because of the emotional, mental, or
physical disability, or state of immaturity of his parent, guardian, or
other custodian" from "neglected" to "dependent."
1969]
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delinquent,3 8 and hence a criminal.39 There is a cruel irony in
the fact that the Rules allow an ex-offender to discard his record,
but do not allow a victim of parental neglect or inability to do
the same. This inconsistency is compounded by the fact that
even a child who meets the statutory definition of delinquency
may be made the subject of a neglect cause if his conduct re-
sults wholly or partially from parental neglect.40
B. THE STRUCTURE OF THE RULES
Article 11 sets forth four basic rules which govern the con-
fidentiality, sealing and destruction of juvenile records. Juvenile
records, within the Article's language, include nearly all docu-
ments relevant to a delinquency cause.41 Included are not only
records of the court but all documents that pertain to the cause
and that are maintained by the state or any subdivision thereof,
including state and local police.42  However, records of traffic
offenses and records maintained by the Youth Conservation
Commission43 are excepted.
Records, once sealed, are sealed absolutely; they are not to
be disclosed "for any purpose to any person."44 The historical
and less sweeping concept of confidentiality is preserved for un-
sealed records. Unsealed records may be disclosed, but only pur-
suant to a court order, which may issue upon a determination
that disclosure is "required for the best interests of the child,
the public safety or the functioning of the juvenile court sys-
tem."45  The Rules attempt to clarify one aspect of confi-
dentiality by specifying persons to whom unsealed records may
be disclosed: juvenile judges and members of the juvenile court
38. 1 CAIrFORNIA GOvERNOR's SPECILu STUDY CoViziVssioN ON JU-
VENILE JUSTICE, RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGES IN CALIFORNIA'S JUVE-
NILE COURT LAW 19 (1960). See Gough, Sealing of Juvenile Records:
A Clean Slate?, 3 SANTA CLARA LAW. 119, 120-21 (1963).
39. See text accompanying note 21 supra.
40. MINN. STAT. § 260.015(10) (1967), as amended, (MnN. SEss.
L. SERV. ch. 503, § 2(h) (1969)) quoted in note 36 supra. Presumably
such an option was originally designed to alleviate the stigma that would
otherwise attach to a child whose delinquency was a result of parental
neglect. Under the Rules, such a child is now more likely to be stig-
matized than the child whose delinquency is not caused by neglect.
41. RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR JUVENILE COURT PROCEEDINGS IN THE
MINNESOTA PROBATE-JUVENILE COURTS I1-: (2) (1969), as amended, (Supp.
Sept. 1969) [hereinafter cited as MJCR].
42. See text accompanying note 90 infra.
43. See note 92 infra.
44. MJCR 11-2(1).
45. MJCR 11-2(2).
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staff, the parties to a cause, persons providing supervision or
having custody of the child, and "any other person having a
legitimate interest in the operation of the juvenile court or in the
child." Present or prospective employers and the military serv-
ices are specifically excluded from the latter category.46
Provisions relating to the actual sealing of delinquency rec-
ords are the heart of the Article. The court shall order seal-
ing upon the occurrence of one of the following three contin-
gencies:47 (1) the child reaches age 21,48 (2) the cause is dis-
missed,49 or (3) the court expunges an adjudication of delin-
quency. 0 In addition to mandatory sealing, the juvenile court
may, in its discretion, order sealing in any delinquency cause
where the youth is not subject to either an outstanding dispo-
sitional order or the Youth Conservation Commission. 5" While
the court may hold a hearing to determine if "proper grounds"
for sealing exist, 2 the Rules establish no guidelines for this
discretionary sealing.53 If one of the three contingencies for
mandatory sealing occurs, or if the court otherwise decides to
order sealing, as the case may be, the court will order all persons
maintaining records concerning the delinquency causes of the
child to remove such records from their files, seal them, and store
them in a separate place set aside for sealed juvenile records.
Subsequently, such persons are to notify the court of their com-
pliance with its order.54
The proceedings covered in sealed records are "deemed never
to have occurred" and the child, or any party to the cause, may
reply accordingly. Persons maintaining sealed records are di-
46. MJCR 11-2(2) (d). "[R]esponsible representatives of public
information media and persons conducting research relating to the ju-
venile court" are deemed to be persons "having a legitimate interest in
the operation of the juvenile court," provided they agree not to publicize
the identity of the child or his parents. Id.
47. MJCR 11-3 (2) (emphasis added).
48. See text accompanying notes 57-72 infra.
49. See text accompanying notes 73 & 74 infra.
50. See text accompanying notes 75-78 infra.
51. MJCR 11-3(1).
52. MJCR 11-3(3).
53. "Discretionary" sealing, as used in this Note, refers to sealing
the record of a child who does not come within the provisions requiring
sealing. It does not mean sealing authorizing "discretionary" disclosure,
since the Rules require that records, once sealed, are sealed totally
and permanently, with no opportunity for subsequent disclosure to any
person for any purpose. MJCR 11-2(1). See §§ III E and III F of the
text. See also text accompanying notes 85-93 infra.
54. MJCR 11-3(3).
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rected to reply to any inquiries, "'We have no record on the
named individual.' ,55
Finally, the court may, in its discretion, order the physical
destruction of any sealed records. The grounds upon which such
a decision may be based are not specified.56
C. MANDATORY Am DISCRETIONARY SEALING
1. At Age 21
The juvenile court is compelled to order sealing when the
juvenile reaches 21 years of age. It has been suggested that seal-
ing be made only if the child petitions the court to do so.57 This,
it is claimed, would give the youth an active role in the sealing of
his record, which would result in increased awareness of his
officially rehabilitated status, which would in turn give him a
greater determination to refrain from unlawful behavior.5" But
while a petition might be such an added stimulus to those who
take advantage of it, there may well be many ex-offenders who,
because of timidity, uncertainty or ignorance would not present
themselves to the court afresh, even for such a salutary purpose.
By requiring the automatic sealing of records, Article 11 has the
advantage of reaching the records of this group. Moreover,
those offenders whose self-confidence and initiative are so lack-
ing as to preclude their going to the courts on their own are per-
haps in even greater need of sealing than those who would
petition.59 Finally, it would seem that the advantages of requir-
ing a petition could be secured without the petition by informing
the youth at his dispositional hearing that his record will be
sealed upon his reaching age 21, and then informing him of that
fact when the record is actually sealed. 60
The primary argument in favor of mandatory sealing
(whether automatically or by petition) is that it allows every
child to start his adult life with a clear record"' and prevents
55. MJCR 11-3(4).
56. MJCR 11-4. In view of the fact that sealing unconditionally
bars subsequent disclosure, there seems -to be no practical reason to de-
lay destruction; or, for that matter, no reason why the intermediate
step of sealing is necessary at all.
57. See Gough, supra note 11, at 185-86.
58. Id.
59. See text accompanying note 12 supra, and sources cited
therein.
60. See Note, supra note 18, at 801. Cf. Gough, supra note 11, at
185.
61. Gough, supra note 38, at 120.
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the inconsistent application of discretionary guidelines by various
judges. Every juvenile is thus deemed entitled to have his re-
cord sealed regardless of conduct engaged in before his eight-
eenth birthday, the point at which juvenile court jurisdiction
ceases .
2
The typical discretionary sealing statute permits sealing only
when pursuant to the court's determination that the child has
satisfactorily rehabilitated. 63 The argument in favor of this ap-
proach is that the privilege is extended only to those juveniles
who "deserve" it; juveniles who are not rehabilitated cannot
take advantage of the protection that sealing offers. 4
Certainly the rehabilitative process is an imperfect one, and
under the Rules some juveniles who are unable or unwilling
to lead lawful lives will have their records sealed. This fact,
however, must be tempered with three observations. First, the
public interest may dictate that the opportunity to protect those
juveniles capable of full rehabilitation outweighs the risk of also
protecting those who are incapable. 5 Second, the argument in
favor of wholly discretionary sealing tends to view sealing as a
reward, and to overlook its potential as a rehabilitative device.0,
Third, any record arising between the cessation of juvenile
court jurisdiction at age 18 and the time of sealing at age 21
will be a criminal one, and hence will not be subject to sealing. 7
Thus, when a juvenile has his record sealed at age 21, he has
concluded a three-year period during which any offenses he
may have committed are a matter of public record. It may con-
vincingly be argued that, at age 21, the immediately preceding
three years are a more reliable index of the youth's future be-
havior than are the first 18 years.68 The implicit three-year in-
62. See MN. STAT. §§ 260.111 & 260.015(2) (1967).
63. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 55-10-117 (Supp. 1969). An addi-
tional and somewhat synonymous condition is that the offender must
not have been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude. Id.
64. See Gough, The Expungement of Adjudication Records of Juve-
nile and Adult Offenders: A Problem of Status, 1966 WASH. U.L.Q. 147,
184.
65. Such a determination is not dissimilar to Blackstone's familiar
admonition, "[I]t is better that ten guilty persons escape than that one
innocent suffer." 4 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *358.
66. See text accompanying notes 10-13 and 29-33 supra.
67. Furthermore, whenever the juvenile court refers the child to a
criminal court for prosecution, juvenile court jurisdiction ceases and the
matter is not subject to sealing, regardless of the offender's age. See
generally MJCR 8-7.
68. See text accompanying notes 30-33 supra. See generally Gough,
supra note 64, at 181-82.
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terval prior to sealing should allay most fears of those who
oppose mandatory sealing because of its indiscriminate inclusion
of all juvenile records. The public policy in favor of encouraging
rehabilitation is then likely to favor the mandatory provisions
of the Rules.
A common provision in juvenile sealing statutes in other
states requires the juvenile to refrain from unlawful conduct for
a certain period of time, generally one to five years, before he
becomes eligible for sealing.69 The major difference between
this and the three-year period implicit in the Rules is that, under
the Rules, a criminal offense between the ages of 18 and 21 will
not prevent sealing of the juvenile record. The rationale behind
the "good behavior period" requirement is that the juvenile
whose record is to be sealed must first demonstrate that he is
capable of living lawfully on his own, without need of super-
vision.7 0 Furthermore, the good beiavior requirement may act
as a deterrent by threatening the youth with forfeiture of the
sealing privilege should he reoffend.
However, the good behavior requirement, while equitable on
its face, can be quite destructive of the ends of rehabilitation.
A conviction of drunkenness or breach of the peace, while con-
sidered minor by criminal standards, is nonetheless a criminal
conviction. Keeping open a juvenile offender's record on this
basis seems ill designed to encourage rehabilitation, as well as
being a weighty penalty imposed in addition to the statutory one.
Imposition of a good behavior requirement, like the wholly dis-
cretionary sealing provisions, also tends to emphasize the re-
ward theory of sealing at the expense of the rehabilitative
process. 7'1
The Rules do not ignore the of:ense altogether; it becomes
part of a criminal record and therefore, employers or prospective
employers may take it into consideration. But the offender
would not be held to account for his entire juvenile record
merely because of a relatively minor infraction between ages 18
and 21. More serious offenses, such as felonies, are quite likely
to be their own warning signals to the prospective employer,
irrespective of any juvenile record the felon might have.
However, if a juvenile is subject to a dispositional order re-
69. See, e.g., ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN,. § 8-238 (1956) (two years).
This requirement is usually imposed in addition to a more general one
requiring "satisfactory rehabilitation."
70. Gough, supra note 64, at 187.
71. See text accompanying note 66 supra.
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quiring confinement until his twenty-first birthday, he is eligible
for sealing simultaneous with his release. In this event, he would
not have had an opportunity since age 18 to demonstrate his
potential for rehabilitation,7 2 nor would there have been a period
during which any unlawful behavior could be entered as part of
his criminal record. Under these circumstances, the balance
would seem to swing in favor of withholding sealing for a
period of time, such as the usual three-year period. This could
be enacted by amending the Rules to require sealing at age 21,
or three years following release from confinement, whichever is
later.
2. Upon Dismissal of the Cause
Whenever the court dismisses a delinquency cause for lack
of jurisdiction or failure of proof, sealing of the records of the
particular cause is mandatory.7 3 This provision would seem to
allow little ground for dispute. When dismissal is due to a lack
of jurisdiction, the required sealing of any records of the cause
that have theretofore accumulated merely eliminates records of
a cause that did not properly belong in the juvenile court
initially. Likewise, if the record is considered an unnecessary
burden for former delinquents, it must a fortiori be such for one
who is not adjudicated delinquent.7 4
3. Expungement of Delinquency
The third occasion for mandatory sealing arises when the
court expunges an adjudication of delinquency in the cause.7 5
72. See text accompanying note 68 supra.
73. MJCR 11-3(2). For a discussion of standards of proof in de-
linquency causes, see Note, Standards of Proof and Admissibility in
Juvenile Court Proceedings, 54 MneN. L. REV. 362, 371 (1969).
74. The present wording reflects an amendment of September, 1969.
Previously, sealing was required when the court dismissed the cause
"for any reason," and the amendment removes one situation from the
requirement of mandatory sealing. In a delinquency cause, where the
court is satisfied that the delinquency has been proven beyond a rea-
sonable doubt, it may order an interim disposition without an adjudica-
tion of delinquency, and at the conclusion of the interim disposition
period, or prior thereto, may find that further supervision is unneces-
sary, and dismiss. MJCR 5-4(1) (b) (ii) (bb). Since dismissal would be
for reasons other than lack of jurisdiction or failure of proof, sealing
apparently is no longer required in such a situation. Presumably, how-
ever, discretionary sealing would be available. See MJCR 11-3(1).
75. MJCR 11-3 (2) (c). Expungement has been defined as "a legis-
lative provision for the eradication of a record of . . . adjudication[;]
... a process of erasing the legal event of" adjudication. Gough,
supra note 64, at 149.
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Prior to promulgation of the Rules, the court had statutory dis-
cretion to expunge the adjudication at any time without affecting
the rest of the record.76 Now, however, it would seem that ex-
pungement of the adjudication is no longer a separate entity,
since sealing of the entire record must follow.
This is an unnecessary provsion at best, and perhaps
an unfortunate one as well. The court can order sealing
in delinquency causes virtually whenever it wishes.7 7 It is there-
fore difficult to envision a situation where the court would now
bother to expunge, since sealing must follow immediately there-
after. At worst, mandatory sealing upon expungement fore-
closes an opportunity for the court, in effect, to seal the adjudi-
cation while keeping available the rest of the record, such as
previous adjudications and dispositions, and social and med-
ical reports. The option would have been a valuable one where
the court wished to aid the youth in gaining employment by ex-
punging the adjudication of delinquency, yet also wished to keep
the record open for consideration at a future dispositional hearing
should the juvenile reoffend.78 This option was apparently
deemed an undesirable one by the drafters of the Rules, pre-
sumably because it was felt that a record must be sealed com-
pletely. But such an approach overlooks the possibility that the
court, faced now with an all-or-nnothing choice, might well
decide not to seal at all, a decision which would clearly be to the
detriment of the child and against the general policy of Article 11.
Thus, the Rules unfortunately abolish expungement per se
by providing that it become merely another name for sealing.
Such a procedure unduly limits the options available to the
court and might well cause the child to bear the burden of an
unsealed record where expungement of the adjudication would
have been both possible and desirable.
4. Discretionary Sealing
As previously noted,79 the usual basis of discretionary seal-
ing in other states is a showing of rehabilitation satisfactory to
the court, usually coupled with a "good behavior period" during
which the offender must be free of further unlawful conduct.
76. MUNE. STAT. § 260.185 (2) (1967).
77. See text accompanying notes 79-.88 infra.
78. Sealed records are not subsequently available to a sentencing
court, whether juvenile or criminal. 1\4MJCR 11-2(1). See text accom-
panying notes 113-122 infra.
79. See text accompanying note 63 supra.
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However, the Rules, unlike comparable provisions in other states,
provide for a period during which records may be sealed,
followed by a point, i.e., age 21, at which they must be
sealed. The fact that sealing is assured eventually must neces-
sarily influence the court's decision of whether to seal prior to
age 21, since a refusal to seal merely postpones the event; it
does not deny it altogether. Thus, it would seem that the ju-
venile must make a convincing case when requesting discretion-
ary sealing, because he is in effect saying that a privilege which
will be his at age 21 should be given to him before that time.
The Rules themselves are of no assistance in determining
what factors should be taken into consideration in making the
decision. A hearing may be held to decide whether there are
"proper grounds" for discretionary sealing, 0 but no clue is given
as to what "proper grounds" are or should be. Several factors
may, however, be suggested.
First, the facts should show a convincing likelihood that the
child will not offend again. This requirement is derived from
two considerations. It preserves the widely accepted belief that
the proper disposition of an offender, juvenile or criminal, de-
pends to a great extent on a knowledge of his prior record and
dispositions.81 Since the juvenile court is precluded from using
sealed records,8 2 a child who reappears before the juvenile court
on a new offense following the sealing of his records would be
deprived of these considerations. To the extent that the sub-
sequent disposition is thereby not suited to the child, both the
child and society suffer.s3 In addition, a requirement that fu-
ture misconduct be highly unlikely recognizes the fact that po-
lice records, as well as court records, are to be sealed.8 4 When
the records are sealed, police are precluded from using infor-
mation contained therein in future investigations. Thus, to the
80. MJCR 11-3(3).
81. See generally M. PAULSEN & S. KADIsH, CRnMINAL LAW AND
ITS PROCESSES 146-68 (1962).
82. See note 78 supra.
83. This consideration extends not only to proper disposition, but
also to whether the child should be referred for prosecution, since the
record of the child is included as a relevant criterion in determining
whether reference is proper. MJCR 8-7(2) (c). See generally, Note,
Reference for Prosecution in Juvenile Court Proceedings, 54 MINN. L.
REv. 389 (1969).
84. MJCR 11-1(2) (b). But see text accompanying notes 92 & 93
infra.
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extent that crime detection is unreasonably impaired, the public
interest would suffer.8 5
Second, it may be advisable to impose a "good behavior pe-
riod" of three years as a prerequisite to the granting of dis-
cretionary sealing. While such a requirement is unnecessary and
perhaps inadvisable where mandato:7 sealing is concerned,8 6 the
situation differs in the discretionary sealing process in that
there is no three-year period comparable to the 18-to-21 age
span during which the youth's unlawful activities are a matter
of public record.87 For reasons heretofore indicated,8 8 it would
not appear advisable to seal the record before the youth has
been on his own for an appreciable length of time.
D. SEALING OF POLICE REcoRDs
The Rules extend sealing to police records by defining rec-
ords to include "all documents, except traffic offense records,
maintained by any representative of the state or state agency,
except the Youth Conservation Commission, insofar as they re-
late to the apprehension, detention, adjudication or disposition of
a child who is the subject of a juvenile court cause."8 9 "Rep-
resentative of the state" includes, inter alia, the county attorney
and his staff, peace officers and any other employee of the state
or any political subdivision thereof.9 0
By its terms, however, Article 11 applies only to those ju-
veniles who are the subjects of juvenile court causes."' Juveniles
for whom no petition is filed following police contact are not sub-
jects of a cause and thus cannot have their records sealed.
The reason for this serious omission apparently lies in the fact
that as rules of court, these Rules lack statutory power, and
therefore can apply only to the records of a child who comes
in contact with the court.9 2 Moreover, a question exists as to
85. See Note, Juvenile Delinquents: The Police, State Courts, and
Individualized Justice, 79 HARv. L. REV. 775, 785 (1966).
86. See text accompanying note 71 supra.
87. If an ex-offender applies for discretionary sealing between the
ages of 18 and 21, any record since his eighteenth birthday is public, but
this necessarily covers less than three years. See text accompanying
notes 67 & 68 supra.
88. See text accompanying note 72 supra.
89. MJCR 11-1(2) (b).
90. MJCR 1-2(r).
91. MJCR 11-1(2) (b).
92. Apparently this reason also underlies the exception of Youth
Conservation Commission (YCC) records from the otherwise sweeping
definition of records found in MJCR 11-1. (2) (b). The YCC was created
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whether the Rules can in fact reach police records of those
juveniles who are subjects of juvenile court causes. By the
terms of rule 11-1(2) (b) such reach is possible. But whether
the unilateral adoption of these rules by juvenile courts is suffi-
cient authority to extend sealing to police records is untested.93
The necessity of including police records within the compre-
hension of a sealing scheme cannot be overemphasized. 4 In fact,
from the individual's point of view, sealing of the police record
can be more important as a rehabilitative tool than the sealing of
the court record.95 The fact that employers often have little
difficulty in gaining access to police records, and that these
records seldom reflect the subsequent disposition of the child
has been noted. 6 The fact gains more significance when one
considers that only about half of recorded police contacts are
referred to the juvenile court.97 The other half are handled
within the police department itself,98 by releasing the child
in 1947, and any delinquent may be committed to its custody. The ju-
venile court can not consign a delinquent directly to incarceration but
must transfer custody to the YCC, which then decides the question of
subsequent disposition. See generally Pirsig, Procedural Aspects of the
Youth Conservation Act, 32 MIINN. L. REV. 471 (1948).
93. Cf. Note, Minnesota Juvenile Court Rules: Brightening One
World for Juveniles, 54 Mhmx. L. REV. 303 (1969). The police are not
likely to cooperate any more than necessary where sealing of juvenile
records is concerned. Though voluntary destruction of police records by
the police themselves is not unknown, such practices are uncommon
and depend upon individual departments. Note, supra note 85, at 787.
As a general rule police oppose automatic and unconditional destruc-
tion where age is the sole determinant factor. G. O'CONNOR & N.
WATSON, JUVENILE DELINQuENcY AND YouTH CRIME: THE POLICE ROLE
62-63 (1965).
94. 2 CAIFORNIA GovERNoR's COmm'N, supra note 24, at 100.
The decision to arrest or not to arrest is, in many instances,
completely in [the beat patrolman's] hands, and his decision,
as well as his use of investigative skills, can be one of the most
important steps in the entire juvenile control process. A poor
approach or an unwise arrest or detention decision at this point
may nullify any future corrective action as well as to vitally
affect the minor's later behavior. Id.
95. See id. at 110.
96. See text accompanying notes 22-25 supra.
97. See Note, supra note 93, at 776; 2 CATFoRNTA GovERNOR'S
COmm'N, supra note 24, at 101; TASK FORCE, supra note 1, at 12. In
1968, 56.4 percent of juveniles taken into custody by police in rural
areas were referred to the juvenile court. In cities with a population
less than 10,000, 44.3 percent were so referred. UNFOaRM CRIME RE-
PORTS-1968, at 106.
98. Occasionally, juveniles may be referred to various public and
private agencies, such as religious or public welfare organizations,
family service bureaus or schools, but such referrals are infrequent.
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to his parents,9 9 or by placing him under informal police su-
pervision for several months'0 0 or by referring him to the ju-
venile bureau of the police department, where he is usually re-
leased after a "hearing" consisting of a confession and a stiff
lecture. 01 Records are generally kept of all steps in these pro-
cedures.102
The effect of these Rules on police records is as yet unknown.
However, if it appears that an appreciable portion of police re-
cords of subjects of juvenile court causes remains unsealed de-
spite the Rules, the sealing requirements should be strength-
ened through statutory enactment. In any event, statutory en-
actment is strongly urged so that those juveniles whose contact
is never extended to the juvenile court may also be afforded the
protection of sealing.
E. "THE. PROCEEDINGS ARE DEEMED NEVER TO HAVE OccuRRED."
The protection afforded by sealing would be illusory if the
employer could force the juvenile to disclose that which the law
prohibits the employer from discovering on his own. To pre-
vent pressure from being brought to bear on the child to disclose
his record, proceedings covered by sealed records are deemed
never to have occurred, and the child, the court or any state or
local agency may reply accordingly 0 3 Courts and agencies are
directed to reply to any inquiry concerning the juvenile, "'We
have no record on the named individual,'" or words to that
effect. 04
However, problems are bound to arise when the law provides,
in effect, that what has happened has not happened. A valid
theoretical argument in support of the provision could be made
when the alternative of not having the provision is considered.
See UN Foav. CRIME REPORTS-1968 at 106; 2 CALIFoRNIA GovEOR'ios
COMlM'N, supra note 24, at 101.
99. 2 CALiFoRNIA GovERNoR's COMM'N, supra note 24, at 101; Note,
supra note 85, at 777.
100. 2 CALIFORNIA GOVERxoR's COMM'N, supra note 24, at 101.
101. Note, supra note 85, at 777-81. Refusal to confess usually re-
sults in referral to the juvenile court. Id. at 781.
102. Id. at 784. See G. O'CoNNoR & N. WATSON, supra note 93, at 62.
103. MJCR 11-3 (4). Such a procedure is recommended in Burns &
Stern, The Prevention of Juvenile Delinquency, in TASK FORCE supra
note 1, at 353, 385. Three states include a similar provision in their seal-
ing statutes. CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 781 (West Supp. 1966);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 55-10-117 (Supp. 1969); VT. STAT. AN. tit. 33, § 665
(Supp. 1969).
104. MJCR 11-3(4).
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If the individual could be required to disclose the content of
sealed records, the purpose of sealing would be circumvented
and the sealing process would quickly become a form without
substance.10 5 Moreover, if all the juvenile could do is reply, in
effect, "No comment," when asked about his record, the employer
will readily infer that a record does exist. Therefore, if the pro-
tection of sealing is to be made a reality, the juvenile must be
allowed to deny that the proceedings ever took place.
The Model Annulment of Conviction Act,106 designed for con-
victions but applicable in theory to juvenile court proceedings,
meets this problem by restricting inquiries that the employer
may make. He may ask only, "Have you ever been arrested for
or convicted of a crime which has not been annulled by a
court?"'107 This provision would, however, present administra-
tive problems. It could not constitutionally apply to employers
outside the state. The youth's remedies would be unwieldy
and inappropriate since courts are generally reluctant to enforce
employment contracts, and a complaint procedure similar to the
type now used in discrimination and civil rights cases would be
cumbersome and, at best, a piecemeal solution to the problem.
Under the Rules, a problem does arise when the juvenile
denies the existence of a record, but is required to account,
perhaps on an employment application, for a period of time in
fact spent in custody. No satisfactory answer to this dilemma
has been proposed. The ex-offender could, of course, simply
list his activities during the time in question under the rubric of
"unemployed," but this response is unsatisfactory for several
reasons. It may be an obstacle to securing employment. It may
arouse suspicion if used to account for a period during which a
child would normally be in school. And most importantly, it
ignores any skills or education the child has gained while in
custody. A solution can be suggested, however. When the ju-
venile is in custody, he is under the authority of the state, and
receives education or training to some extent. Since the pur-
pose of the training is to provide skills useful in future employ-
ment, it may be desirable to allow the individual to list those
skills as gained in the "employment" of the state. This would
105. This is not to imply that the juvenile should never be allowed
to disclose the record if he so chooses. See § III G of the text.
106. "An Act to Authorize Courts to Annul a Record of Conviction
for Certain Purposes," in Annulment of a Conviction of Crime, 8 Cmnnvi
& DELINQ. 97, 100 (1962).
107. Id.
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seem to reflect as closely as possible the actual situation without
revealing custody. The answer is not perfect, of course. When
the child is in custody during his normal schooling years, for in-
stance, such a response may arouse the same suspicion as "un-
employed." However, the child must be allowed to attribute to
the period of custody an activity or an education most like that
actually experienced if the basic protections of sealing are to be
fully realized.
F. USE OF THE RECORD IN SUBSEQUENT JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS
Sealed records are not available for use in subsequent ju-
dicial proceedings.10 8 This exclusion is based in part upon a stat-
utory provision' 9 prohibiting evidence given by the subject of
a juvenile court cause, or his disposition, from being admissible
in evidence against him in any "case or proceeding" in a non-
juvenile court. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, under a sim-
ilar statute, however, has held that the use of juvenile court
records in a presentence investigation following an ex-juvenile
offender's guilty plea in a criminal trial is proper."0 The
court reasoned that such information was not used in "evidence"
against the accused, since it followed a guilty plea and was used
to determine a proper sentence. The court relied on Williams
v. New York"' and similar cases which stress the importance of
full knowledge of the offender's background in setting an appro-
priate disposition." 2
When the ex-juvenile offender appears before a criminal
court after his twenty-first birthday, his juvenile record has al-
ready been sealed.113 However, any criminal proceedings since
age 18 are not within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court" 4 and
thus are freely available for presentence investigation. There-
fore, a person over 21 who has not offended since age 18 is neces-
sarily a first offender for purposes of sentencing since the court
108. See note 78 supra.
109. Anl . STAT. § 260.211(1) (1967).
110. Commonwealth ex Tel. Hendrickson v. Meyers, 393 Pa. 224,
144 A.2d 367 (1958).
111. 337 U.S. 241 (1949).
112. The decision in Hendrickson has been criticized on the grounds
that the enactment of the statute forbidding use of juvenile court infor-
mation in evidence in a subsequent "case or proceeding" is an indi-
cation of the unreliable nature of these records. Rappeport, Some
Legal Aspects of Juvenile Court Proceedings, 46 VA. L. REV. 908, 921-23
(1960).
113. See MJCR 11-3(2) (a).
114. MIANN. STAT. § 260.111 (1) (1967).
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has no knowledge of, nor access to, the convicted defendant's ju-
venile record. Such a result does not seem manifestly unfair,
since the convict will have spent at least three years without of-
fending, and to sentence him as a first offender would not be a
gross departure from the philosophy behind increased sentences
for multiple offenders. To the extent the individual has of-
fended since his eighteenth birthday, however, he would be sub-
ject to any applicable multiple offender statute 1 5 or to the dis-
cretion of the sentencing court in imposing a longer sentence
within the statutory limits.116
Advocates of full disclosure of sealed records to a sentencing
court argue that the purpose of sealing is to aid in the rehabilita-
tion of the offender, and that by his new crime the offender has
demonstrated his failure to rehabilitate. 117 This attitude implies
that rehabilitation is an all-or-nothing proposition; one who
has not reformed completely has not reformed at all. But
the fact that one offends after the record has been sealed
does not indicate that the entire rehabilitative process, in-
cluding the sealing, has been a complete failure. The more
offenses, or the more serious an offense, he commits, of course,
the greater is the permissible inference that the rehabilitative
process has in fact failed. However, as he reoffends, his criminal
record lengthens. The court can and should consider this public
record in passing sentence.
G. SUBSEQUENT DIsCLOSURE OF T=E REcORD BY THE JUVF xLE
After a juvenile record has been sealed, the blanket pro-
hibition on disclosure" 8 necessarily precludes the child himself
from subsequently causing his record to be disclosed, for what-
ever reason. Such a provision is designed to prevent pressure
from being brought to bear on the child by those who seek to
have the record disclosed. If the ex-offender has the power to
cause disclosure, prospective employers could make disclosure
a condition of employment, thus defeating the rehabilitative pur-
pose of sealing. If the ex-offender is unable to cause disclosure,
employer pressure will be foredoomed and consequently, will
not be brought.
Such an argument, however, overlooks several factors. First,
115. See, e.g., MnN. STAT. § 609.155 (1967).
116. Cf. MODEL PENAL CODE § 7.01 (Proposed Official Draft, 1962).
117. See, e.g., Annulment of a Conviction of Crime, 8 Cimi &
DELiNQ. 97, 99-100 (1962).
118. MJCR 11-2 (1).
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the Rules permit the juvenile to deny the existence of a record
altogether." 9 The prospective employer is thus usually unable
to tell from applications or normal interviews who actually has
been involved in juvenile proceedings and who has not. If he is
to bring pressure on any applicant to cause disclosure of a rec-
ord, he must bring pressure on all. applicants, including those
with no records in fact. Whether an employer would be willing
to expend the time and money necessary to confront each appli-
cant in an effort to compel him to reveal a record which may
or may not exist is questionable. In addition, the employer
would necessarily be implying that he does not believe the appli-
cant's denial, and may well conclude that such a tactic would
give an unfavorable impression to applicants with no record in
fact, perhaps causing them to withdraw their applications and
to seek employment elsewhere.
The absolute nondisclosure theory also holds that if
juveniles could cause disclosure of their records, waiver pro-
visions by which they agree to cause disclosure could become
common on application forms as a condition of employment.
However, an applicant who denies that he has a record would
not normally sign a waiver allowing disclosure of a record;
rather, he would react as anyone with no record in fact would
react-by ignoring the waiver entirely. In so doing, he would
be protected by the Rules, which deem the proceedings never to
have occurred. 20 Therefore, the inclusion of such a waiver by
employers would seem unlikely. However, should an employer
seek to circumvent this dilemma by requiring every applicant
to sign a waiver, the courts should simply refuse to honor such
"waivers.' 2 1 Before allowing disclosure, the court should re-
quire a letter from the child to the court (or, whenever
possible, a personal appearance by the child) indicating to
whom the record is to be revealed, and, perhaps, for what pur-
pose. 22 The burden of securing disclosure would thus be set
so high that it would be impractical for employers to require
applicants to follow this procedure when the identity of those
who in fact have records is unknown. At the same time, the
burden upon the individual is slight in comparison with the
benefit of having his record disclosed.
Furthermore, a procedure allowing the individual to cause
119. MJCR 11-3 (4). See text accom.panying note 103 supra.
120. MJCR 11-3(4).
121. See Burns & Stern, supra note 103, at 385.
122. See VT. STAT. A.. tit. 33, § 665 (Supp. 1969).
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disclosure might in fact serve as a beneficial "safety valve" to
preserve the rehabilitative ideal. There are two situations
where such a procedure could be a positive force: when the
employer has independent knowledge that the individual has
had contact with the juvenile court, or when the individual him-
self voluntarily admits such past contact.
It is not unlikely that in many communities, especially in
smaller communities, a child's contact with the law may become
a matter of quasi-public knowledge.123 Even where these con-
tacts are quite minor,124 perhaps not even culminating in an
adjudication of delinquency, the distortions of gossip or boasts, 25
incubated by time, may result in an exaggerated version of the
facts. If in the future, a local employer refuses to hire the
individual on the basis of this "record," the child is without
recourse to provide factual information of his past. He must
remain at the mercy of the public's conception of his behavior.
A second situation where disclosure would be beneficial to
the juvenile exists when he voluntarily admits the existence of
such a record to prospective employers or to recruiting
personnel from the military services. It is quite possible
that, when asked about the existence of a juvenile record,
the individual would admit it despite the fact that he is not
bound to do so.126 He may do so because, out of simple ignorance
of the Rules' protection, he believes disclosure is required. He
may do so because he wishes to be straightforward with the
employer and may not want to risk the chance that the em-
ployer may find out from other, possibly distorted sources. He
may become confused over what to indicate as his activities dur-
ing the time spent in custody.1 27 He may make an inadvertent
123. See Lemert, The Juvenile Court-Quest and Realities, in
TASK FORCE, supra note 1, at 91, 93; Brucker, The Right to Know About
Juvenile Delinquents, 15 Juv. CT. JuDGEs J. 16, 18 (Summer, 1964).
124. Offenses committed by delinquents in nonmetropolitan areas
tend to be not only less frequent but less serious than those in urban
areas. Polk, Delinquency and Community Action in Nonmetropolitan
Areas, in TASK FORCE, supra note 1, at 343.
125. Lawlessness can be a desired image or a source of status
among peers to some delinquents. Wolfgang, The Culture of Youth,
in TAsx FORCE, supra note 1, at 145, 149-50; Freedman & Cohen, Delin-
quency, Employment and Youth Development, in READINGS IN DELIN-QUENCY AND TREATMENT 17, 20 (R. Schasre & J. Wallach eds. 1965).
Under such circumstances, boasting and exaggeration would be ex-
pected.
126. MJCR 11-3(4).
127. See pp. 451-52 supra.
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reference to his record or to related matters that indicate past
contact with the juvenile court.
In any of these situations-whether the employer has inde-
pendent knowledge of, or the juvenile for various reasons re-
veals, the existence of past delinquent activities-Article 11 al-
lows the juvenile no means of substantiating the facts so that
the actual extent of the activity and. contact can be made known.
Thus the employer cannot know the actual extent of the juve-
nile's conduct, even when the misconduct has been slight.
Therefore, it is submitted that am exception to absolute non-
disclosure be made in favor of the individual. Such a provision,
perhaps modeled on the statutes of California, Utah or Ver-
mont, 28 would add needed flexibility to allow the fullest pro-
tection to the individual and to encourage the greatest realiza-
tion of the rehabilitative ideal. 29
IV. CONCLUSION
The sealing of records can undoubtedly benefit both the
child and society by removing the practical barriers to employ-
ment and by symbolizing society's willingness to allow the ex-
delinquent to start afresh. Generally, the Mlinnesota Rules em-
body a thoughtful and thorough procedure designed to insure
maximum benefit to the child in this respect. However, several
specific changes should be made to complete this procedure:
1. Rules 11-3 (1) and 11-3 (2) should be amended to provide
for sealing of records in neglect and dependency causes.
2. Rule 11-3(2) (a) should be amended to provide manda-
tory sealing at age 21, or three years following release
from confinement, whichever is later.
3. Rule 11-3(2) (c), providing that sealing shall follow ex-
pungement, should itself be expunged.
4. An effective means of including police records within
the ambit of sealing should be devised. Statutory en-
actment of Article 11 would seem to be the most direct
means of effecting this protection.
5. Rule 11-2(1) should be amended to provide that the
child who was the subject of the cause may cause dis-
closure of sealed records.
128. See note 34 supra.
129. Such a provision would necessitate a period of time between
sealing and destruction under MJCR 11-4. Ten years is suggested.
If the juvenile does not need or desire disclosure by that time, it is
unlikely that he ever will.
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